tentional misunderstanding or a deliberate misinterpretation of the SEA? Has it been crafted on purpose in order to eventually justify protective counter-measures against a gradually emerging competitor?
At present, this vision of a "Fortress Europe" is fading again. 1 But why? Because of fluctuations in economic interests or because of a better legal assessment of the SEA? Finally, can this shift be accounted for primarily through legal considerations or rather through a combination of political or economic strategies?
The creation of the internal market by the end of 1992 will be closely monitored by the EC's trading partners. The Community may well have to face new charges of protectionist ambitions and subsequent reproaches from abroad in the near future. Thus, a legal analysis of the SEA should try to clarify first and foremost its legal implications for third countries. Such an analysis, however, cannot identify the real motives and impulses behind the ongoing process of integration. It will be for disciplines other than the law to explain why Europe is reaching out for new economic frontiers.
The SEA entered into force on July 1,1987. Its primary objective is to progressively establish an internal market within a five years period ending on December 31,1992. The textual appearance of the SEA is as confusing as its legal content an unusual numbering of articles up to "Art. 130 T" 2 in order to be squeezed systematically into the existing Community treaties. In addition, there are a great number of cross-references and twenty declarations annexed to the Final Act, 3 thus making the SEA a document of apparent compromises.
The legal content of the SEA seems equally ambiguous and confusing. Within the Community, it is common ground that the SEA attempts to overcome the countless crises which have accompanied the creation of the "common market" since 1951-57. Yet, the new concept of an "internal market", in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital shall be ensured (now Article 8A), has been met with less than unanimous enthusiasm among the Community institutions and the private sector. For same, especially for the European Parliament which had adopted a far-reaching Draft for a European Union Treaty, 4 the SEA is not inventive enough and represents nothing more than a fig leaf to cover up the lack of willingness to arrive at further progress. 5 Five years are a short period of time. It is astonishing to see that many of the first reactions and predictions should have proved inadequate. Even the "Fortress Eu-rope" charge levelled against the Community has ebbed off after the settlement of a number of transatlantic trade disputes and the successful Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round in April 1989. 6 In addition, the Trade Negotiations Committee responsible for the calendar of the Uruguay Round has fixed the date for the conclusion of this Round for December 1990. 7 For some time, it appeared to be impossible that the Uruguay Round would ever be terminated before the effects of what is now commonly referred to as «1992» would be felt in international trade relations. Now, however, it seems more and more unlikely that the creation of the internal market will, necessarily, lead to a higher degree of protectionism, the idea being that a European internal market does not of itself adversely affect agreements and negotiations under the aegis of the GATT. The EC Commission has declared that the internal market will be created in full respect of the EC's international obligations and that the level of protectionism will under no circumstances be higher than at present In reacting to the accusations of creating a protectionist refuge, the Commission formulated the concept of "Europe -World Partner." This concept was confirmed at by the European Council meeting in Rhodes on 3 December 1988. 8 .
The following analysis of the effects of the SEA on foreign trade relations may be premature or superficial in that it tries to approach this subject from a purely legal perspective from outside the institutional framework. Furthermore, the outcome of the present legislative and economic process is still fairly unpredictable.
Therefore, this analysis will start off on rather safe ground. The following Part II will simply scrutinize the text of the SEA for any element which may refer to or which may obviously have repercussions on the EC's foreign trade relations. Part III will then discuss the possible legal implications of the creation of the internal market for trade relations after 1992. In Part IV further political and economic implications of the SEA for third countries will be outlined, while the final Part V will be devoted to some thoughts on whether the SEA might serve as a model of world-wide trade relations. Given the fast development in the direction of the internal market, a number of questions and problems cannot be answered with certainty, leaving them for more detailed analysis in future issues of this Journal.
Community's institutional framework. To the unbiased reader, the amendments could take the appearance of mere "window-dressing": Art 8 A introduces the notion of an "internal market", replacing the well-established one of a "common market" in Art. 2 of the original EEC Treaty. It is difficult to discern differences between these two notions. 9 Consequently, the SEA only purports to realize under a new flag the objectives which had already been set out in die founding treaties of 1951-57, by setting a definite date for the completion of the "internal market", i.e. 31 December 1992,10 and t»y streamlining the decision-making process, that is by opening the field of harmonization to majority decisions in the Council (Art 100A). A further reform consists in conceding the European Parliament (EP) a greater influence within the newly designed "procedure of cooperation" under Art 149. And, finally, the conclusion of treaties of accession and of "association" -whatever that meanshave become subject to the prior approval of the European Parliamentln addition, the SEA explicitly confers new legislative powers on the Community: in the field of economic and monetary cooperation, health and safety of workers, regional policy, research and technological development as well as environmental protectionlegislative areas in which the Community had already taken actions on the basis of inherent powers or, more specifically, on the basis of Art. 235.
Clearly, the text of the SEA underlines the Member States' introverted intentions to achieve the internal market within the Community. No mention is made, for example, of a reform of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) under Art 110 et seq., or of its various instruments which could be applied to protect the internal market against third countries -with the exception of the amendment to Art. 28 which now empowers the Council, deciding by a qualified majority and no longer by unanimity, to alter autonomously the Common Customs Tariff.
Yet, there are three explicit, albeit minor references to foreign relations. First, the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the SEA refers to Europe's responsibility to speak with one voice and act in unity and solidarity in order to defend Europe's common interests. However, the preamble is not legally binding and may only help the interpreter in construing the SEA. It obviously refers to the incorporation of the EPC, as the fifth paragraph of the preamble underlines the importance of maintaining world peace and international security. The incorporation in Art. 1(3) and Art 30 SEA of the EPC may be considered a second element which bears on relations with third countries: this incorporation, however, does not add any new competence to the Community. It simply restates existing practices which have been developed by the Member States outside the formal structure of the EC Treaties. The relevant Art. 30 SEA is nevertheless likely to generate more consistency in the EC's external economic policy on the one hand and the more comprehensive foreign policies agreed upon in the framework of the EPC on the other hand -both branches being linked by the obligation of coherence in Art 30(5) SEA.
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The third clause relating to foreign relations is contained in Art 130R(5) which, in environmental matters, provides for a cooperation between the Community and its Member States on the international level "within their respective spheres of competence." This cooperation is not meant to bar Member States from concluding international agreements on their own (subpara. 2) as long as the Community has not enacted legislation or concluded international agreements in the field of environmental protection.
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On the whole, the SEA does not change the CCP as it has developed under the EEC Treaty. Since 1957, one of the primary objectives of the EEC Treaty has been to contribute to the progressive abolition of all restrictions on international trade (cf. 6th paragraph of the preamble to the EEC Treaty). Art. 110(1) expressly mentions the harmonious development of world trade. Since the end of the transitional period on 1 July 1968, the EC has started to act on behalf of its Member States within the framework of GATT and has concluded a number of GATT agreements. 13 This general orientation towards multilateral international cooperation has guided the Community in the negotiations during the Uruguay Round and was not reversed, redirected or in any way revised by the text or the motives of the SEA. does not contain any reference to the CCP except for one short passage on the Communities' identity 15 which, however, could be understood as to give the Community a more "aggressive" approach vis-d-vis third countries. But in essence, the White Paper should be understood as spelling out the legislative programme for the completion of the "internal market." The SEA does not refer explicitly to this Paper, but the Conference of the EC Member States which concluded the SEA did so in one of the many declarations contained in the Final Act 16 Bearing in mind the brevity of these isolated references to the Community's external relations, the mere language of the SEA should hardly have caused so much concern in many countries outside of the EC. The Community will continue to be bound by its founding treaties and by its international obligations which -according to the doubtful, but widely accepted doctrine of the Court of Justice -take priority over any act of secondary Community law. 17 How then could -judged by its actual wording -the rather harmless SEA have come to be identified with the imagery of a "Fortress Europe"? Would it not be more reasonable to leave the debate to economists and politicians to come up with the final analysis of the external effects of the internal market after 1 January 1993?
Such an approach would overlook a number of genuinely legal implications for third countries which are inherent in the process of creating the internal market under the SEA. It is these indirect legal implications that shall be identified in the following section.
III. The SEA's Legal Implications for Third Countries
The completion of the internal market by the end of 1992 -and this does not appear to be an unrealistic goal at present (July 1989) 18 -will have external effects on third 15 "Moreover the commercial identity of the Community must be consolidated so that our trading partners will not be given the benefit of a wider market without themselves making similar concessions",White Paper, supra note 14, para. third countries in at least five different areas which are related to (1) the internal market without any internal frontiers, (2) the enlarged internal competences given to the Community, (3) the more streamlined decision-making process, (4) the conclusion of future treaties of association and accession and (5) the integration of the EPC into the institutional framework of the EC.
The Internal Market a) The Internal Market and ERTA: parallel external powers
In contrast to the CCP under Art 110 et seq., which, according to the interpretation of the Court of Justice, 19 attribute an exclusive competence to the Community, the EC has to rely on merely concurrent competences in most other legislative areas. This rule applies also where matters coming within the scope of the Community's concurrent legislative powers concern relations with third countries. Applying the principles developed in the ERTA case, 20 as long as the Community does not use its internal powers under the EEC Treaty, it is still possible for Member States to exercise their foreign relations powers and enter into agreements with third countries or international organizations. Conversely, once the EEC has enacted internal legislation, the foreign relations power will have to be exercised by the EC as well. Member States may then no longer interfere in the internal policy-making process within the Community by concluding agreements with third countries whenever the EC has made use of its competence exhaustively. 21 The ERTA principles have, however, been interpreted restrictively in the Court's recent case-law 22 and still give rise to controversy in interpreting the doctrine. The creation of the internal market depends upon the prior adoption of a multitude of legislative acts stipulating common policies for the various sectors of economic activities. Once this legislative programme has been adopted , the Community will have become competent and responsible to deal with third countries and to enter into binding agreements. As a result the international role of the Community will be stronger by 1993 once the common policies necessary for the completion of the internal market have been adopted. In conformity with the Community's obligation under the GATT, the internal rules on the trade in goods will have to be dealt with separately from the trade in services, for which -so far -binding commitments still have to be negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
b) The Free Movement of Goods
Much of the internal legislative programme has to do with the free movement of goods (e.g. customs legislation, trade marks etc.). In principle, the implementation of the internal market rules will not affect the conduct of the external CCP, as it is laid down in the EEC Treaty -with at least one important exception which relates to Art. 115 EEC Treaty.
Under this Article the Commission can authorize Member States to take national protective measures in order to ensure that the execution of measures of commercial policy taken in accordance with the CCP is not obstructed by deflection of trade and does not lead to economic difficulties in any Member State if the measures taken differ from each other.
Thus a great number of quantitative restrictions have been authorized to be applied at the internal border between the EC Member States. The continuation of such national quantitative restrictions will be incompatible with the disappearance of physical, technical, financial and fiscal frontiers between the Member States. Consequently, the Commission is intent on putting an end to the system of authorized national measures. Since the entry into force of the SEA, the Commission has already succeeded in reducing the number of authorizations given under Art US. 23 At the end of 1988 there were still national restrictions in force which concerned 22 sensitive products (two-thirds of which were textiles) imported from some thirty countries. It is difficult to predict when and under what conditions the Commission will be able to abolish all national quotas, which -in the end -would give a net-advantage to the respective third countries. It cannot be ruled out, however, that some "hard core" national quotas in industrial manufactures will have to be replaced by new community-wide quantitative restrictions -provided that these restrictions are justifiable under the GATT. 25 They could only be imposed for a limited period of time and only with a steadily decreasing effect. Much, however, will depend on the attitude of the respective third countries and whether their exporting industries are willing not to take advantage of the situation by abruptly increasing exports into the Community. Voluntary export restraints in certain sensitive areas could help the Community to overcome difficulties during the time which will be required to adjust the formerly protected national markets.
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The policy of phasing out the various measures under Art US will particularly affect three areas. In the textile industry, which is governed by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, 27 numerous national quotas exist and will have to be abolished by the end of 1992. 28 The realization of this objective is linked to the outcome of the ongoing Uruguay negotiations which could result either in a prolongation of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (IV) or in the textile industry being reintegrated into the overa A 511 GATT system. These special preferences were upheld by special authorizations under Art. 115 in order to avoid the re-exportation of such bananas to other EC Member States for which the CCT on bananas is applicable (for example Benelux).
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Any Community-wide quota to be introduced before the end of 1992 would require Community-wide rules of origin. The traditional and basic rule is that a product is held to be of Community origin if the "last substantial process or operation that is economically justified" has taken place in the Community. 32 There are no indications that the EC intends to change this rule. The EEA does not refer to this question. However, given a great number of new products developed under new technologies, the Community will have to apply its rules of origin and will have to interpret these rules as, for example, what may be meant by "the last substantial process or operation" in the case of the production of chips or other products. 33 The ECJ, answering the question whether chips are of foreign or community origin, has laid down the limits for the EC Commission's powers to issue implementing regulations on the interpretation of the Council's Regulation No 802/68. 34 The language, at least, of the SEA, does not hint at any solution to the heated controversy over, for example, a product's required local content and thus to its origin. Again, a common understanding between the Community and its trading partners appears to be necessary.
Even if measures pursuant to Art. 115 will have been phased out by 1992, it is not yet clear whether and how Art. 100A(4) and 100B(2) will become operative. These rules allow any Member State to continue to apply national rules if the Council, by majority vote, either has decided on the harmonization of rules under Art 100A(l) or has decided on a system of mutual recognition of rules for the period beyond 1992 (Art. 100B(l) and (2)). Such a differentiated application would have to be justified either on the grounds of "major needs referred to in Art. 36 ", or in terms of environmental protection or working conditions. Thus far, the Member States have apparently not invoked the unilateral escape-clause under Art. 100A(4) EEC Treaty. But any future application may affect third countries and could be interpreted as a measure of nationally disguised protectionism.
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Apart from the gradual phasing out of national quantitative import restrictions, a special benefit for third countries and their exporting industries will emerge from the completion of the internal market in that the harmonization of technical standards and other rules will benefit the free movement of goods irrespective of their country of origin. For example, the Community has already extended autonomously the regulation introducing a Single Document for goods in transit to goods originating from third countries.
36 By Convention of 20 May 1987, the Community entered into an agreement with the EFTA countries on these rules and also agreed to a common transit procedure. 37 Art 100B provides that the Council may decide on a system of mutual recognition of all standards which have not been unified by the end of 1992. 38 This means that all exports into the Community will have to observe either the newly harmonized rules or just the specific technical norms of any one of the Member States in order to be marketed throughout the Community. As a rule, Member States did not attempt to uphold discriminating norms and standards for goods originating from third countries when they were obliged to accept harmonized rules within the Community.
The benefit of a single set of norms and technical standards will descend as a windfall profit on third countries so that it would only be logical for the Community to ask its trading partners for equivalent advantages where they might not exist by the end of 1992. 39 Finally, the Community's foreign relations power in the field of technical norms and standards will have materialized by that time. Thus, no change in the existing rules is envisaged. 45 The Commission, however, would have to draw up regular reports on the degree of access granted to Community banks by the various foreign governments concerned. If it finds that third countries do not offer "effective access" for banks from Member States of the EC comparable with the conditions under which third country banks may operate within the Community, it will then open negotiations with a view to improving the access of Community banks on the foreign market 46 The Community thus has moved to a compromise solution which seeks to strike a balance between outright demands for at least equivalent access which comes close to "reciprocal treatment", and just national treatment. 47 In any event, the Uruguay Round will have to decide whether the internal market could serve as a model of a world-wide services regime. The Mid-Term Review Agreements of the Uruguay Round of 5-8 April 1989 state rather diplomatically that a system of "effective market access, including national treatment" for foreigners offering services should be agreed upon. 48 The SEA and its internal market favours, in general, a liberal approach. However, third states have to be aware that, in specific fields, exceptions to this general approach may occur at any time. This is, for example, the case in the field of television, 49 in which rules providing for a quota for films of European origin have been adopted.
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The foregoing considerations have shown that the final shape of the rules governing the internal market will also depend to a large extent also on the attitude displayed by the Community's trading partners towards offering equivalent and effective access to their markets. Moreover, the completion of the internal market will bring about an improved standard of competitiveness in some -until now heavily protected -Community industries by holding the prospect of economies of scale. To what extent this may have an effect on the EC's role on third markets and thus allow a more liberal Common Commercial Policy is not so much a legal as an economic question which will be discussed briefly in Part IV. 
New Competences for the EC: Parallel Powers
The SEA recognizes new areas of concurrent competences for the Community (environment, research, health and working conditions, regional and monetary policies). In all these fields, the Community had already taken action on the basis of Art. 235. The formal recognition of these competences by the SEA will make it easier for the Community to develop more coherent internal policies. Though the SEA does not mention the foreign relations powers in these fields, with the exception of the areas of research and environment, the Community will be able to cooperate in these matters as well with third countries as with international organizations. As has been noted above, internal powers conferred upon the Community imply parallel external powers. However, unless the Community has taken action under these implied external powers, the Member States still may conclude international agreements and negotiate in international bodies. They have to take into account any future activity of the EC in the sphere of its concurrent powers and have to provide, for example, together with a given third state that an envisaged bilateral agreement should not frustrate any future activity of the EEC in this field. This obligation follows from Art. 5(2) EEC Treaty. Finally, Member States are preempted only when the Community has exercised its external powers.
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Concerning environmental protection, for example, Art. 13OR(5) explicitly authorizes the Community to conclude international agreements -"without prejudice to Member States' competence." This wording is rather obscure and has already led to diverging interpretations. 52 In addition, the Community may only use its powers under Art. 130R if it is found that the environment can be "better" protected by Community measures than by measures adopted by the individual Member States. With respect to third countries, it remains to be seen to what extent the Community will be able to negotiate agreements. According to Art. 228(1), international agreements are concluded by the Council, which implies the consent of the EC Member States. This consent may be more easily obtained if the Member States could be assured that the Court of Justice would give a narrow interpretation with regard to the preemptive effect of such agreement concluded by the Council. A pragmatic approach, including the negotiation and conclusion of mixed agreements, might eventually prevail even after 1992. 
Modifications to the Decision-Making Process
One of the major achievements of the SEA lies in a cautious reform of the decisionmaking process. Three aspects in particular may in the long run affect third countries.
The first concerns voting procedures in the EC Council. The SEA provides for more cases in which the Council may act by a qualified majority. This applies mainly to the field of harmonization of technical rules and norms which will bear directly on the future shape of the internal market (Ait. 100A). The possibility of qualified majority decisions had already been envisaged in other provisions of the EEC Treaty -for example in Art. 113(4) for the CCP. Though the Council, in practice, has taken majority decisions in budgetary matters and foreign trade relations, it was, at least, reluctant to decide by a majority vote before the adoption of the SEA.
From a third country's point of view, the impact of the new and expanded voting practices may be felt mostly in decisions on such sensitive issues as the use of trade instruments, 33 in decisions relating to the trade negotiations within the GATT framework, or in any procedural decisions as part of the GATT dispute settlement procedures. In all these areas, the Council has, since the SEA took effect, shown less reluctance to practice majority voting.
Moreover, experience under the SEA has apparently confirmed the observation that it has become more and more difficult for one Member State to block majority decisions in the Council by using a veto. That has not only been the experience of the United Kingdom government, 54 but also of other Member States' governments who had to discover the impossibility of upholding an isolated veto in the face of a united block of eleven governments determined to arrive at a decision.
Yet, however efficient the decision-making process within the Council may have become, it still cannot be compared with the decision-making capacity the longestablished national government enjoys. Even if the Council continues to apply majority voting, it is by no means clear whether -after 1992 -the free traders or the traditionally more protectionist oriented members will prevail.
A second important reform on the decision-making process relates to the growing influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission. Under the new procedure of cooperation inserted into Art. 149, any proposal from the Commission will carry much greater political force by the time it has reached the Council than in Council which was directed against the degree to which Member States can take pan in the as in the Council, various economic philosophies and political tendencies are represented within the ranks of the Commission. In contrast to the Council, however, the Member States' influence on the Commission itself is less strong, since the Commissioners are protected by a guarantee of independence under primary Community law.
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A clearer picture of how third countries might be affected by the reformed decision-making process under the SEA can be obtained by examining the modified rules which govern the negotiation and conclusions of accession or association agreements 61 .
Accession and Association Agreements : A New Responsibility for the EP
Art. 237 and 238, as modified by the SEA, provide for the EP's express assent prior to the conclusion of any agreement of accessions or association. Initially, the EP's new involvement was held to be rather meaningless. Indeed, assuming that all EC Member States consent to the accession of a new Member State, it is difficult to conceive how the EP could block such an intended accession by refusing to lend its approval. However, the EP would certainly try to influence the conduct of the negotiations by attaching certain conditions to its assent 62 In the case of association agreements pursuant to Art. 238, the EP has already proven its political strength and independence by initially declining to give its assent to three protocols which were to be annexed to the Association Agreement with Israel.
63 Since 1 July 1987, the EP has debated 31 other proposals concerning agreements of association (up to December 1988) . 64 In all these cases, the EP eventually gave its assent, but -as happened in the case of the agreement with Israel -it is likely that the EP will put to use its recently gained political prestige by making such a vote conditional upon the observance of human rights and the adherence to a democratic foundation of government in the respective third countries. 65 However, it may already be foreseen that there will be political pressure by some EC Member States to base EC agreements more on Art. 113 and 114 which does not provide for any formal participation of the EP. 66 In addition, there is no reliable case-law as to the dividing-line between agreements on association and agreements on trade issues.
The Inclusion of the European Political Cooperation
The formal inclusion of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) into primary Community law 67 constitutes an attempt to render the EC's and the Member States' actions on the international plane more effective. To this end Art. 30(2A) SEA seeks to achieve a higher degree of coherence in the external policies of the EC and the EPC. Member States acting either through the EC Council or the EPC are under an obligation "to ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually developed and defined." A new European identity could emerge from this reform and could give further impetus to the actions undertaken by the EC in foreign affairs. Despite the linkage between the EPC and the EC, the legal quality of the EPC was not changed. 68 In the future, it will be impossible to join the Community without adhering to the EPC at the same time. No Member State can cancel the EPC unilaterally. Thus, Austria under the new regime of the SEA would not be able to become a member solely to the three Community treaties without accepting at the same time obligations under the EPC.
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In conclusion, one can identify as the SEA's main aim the construction of an internal market the results of which will be a growing economic interdependence between the 12 Member States. In other words, the SEA's thrust is not towards a reform of the EC's external relations, although implicitly it does carry a number of legal implications for third countries. These will follow either from the very creation of the internal market, the improved decision-making process, or from the inclusion of the EPC into the Communities' framework. The degree to which third countries will become the focal point of legally significant changes to the Community's external policies, emanating from the internal consolidation and reform, will be determined by their own attitude and conduct vis-d-vis the forthcoming internal market. It is not at all inconceivable that the SEA's internal liberalization achievements will have an external counterpart with respect to the EC's foreign trade relations. The EC's participation in the Uruguay Round will be the test case and demonstrate whether this proposition holds true. Apart from these more legal observations there are a number of political and economic assessments, some of which conclude that the EC, after 1992, will concentrate its efforts on building the internal market and will, as a result, be inclined to become more protectionist It is certainly not for a lawyer to comment on these assertions. Nonetheless, a few political and economic assessments will be mentioned briefly in the following part in order to stimulate further interdisciplinary debate. 
IV. Political and Economic

Is the Internal Market About to Become More Protectionist?
Speculation on the future level of protectionism surrounding the completed internal market runs high -especially amongst economists. 72 According to some of these views, the possible gain in competitiveness will not extend to every sector of industry and especially not in less advanced EC Member States. Nevertheless, demands for continued or even higher protection will have to confront pleas for a reduction of tariff or non-tariff barriers in order to open up world markets for the more competitive industries.
Other arguments of rising protectionist tendencies in the EC relate to the vagueness in the Commission's White Paper on domestic subsidies and the continued preferences for domestic industries in the field of public procurement 73 All these tools of protectionist policies could be used to compensate for both the agreed standstill during the Uruguay Round and any new international agreements entered into by the Community.
However, subsidies handed out by individual Member States are not the issue of the SEA. The unchanged rules in Art. 92 et seq. EEC Treaty continue to be applicable as well as the relevant rules of the GATT Code on Subsidies which concern subsidies both of national and Community provenance. 74 As for public procurement, the internal policy of the EC is directed towards a wide opening of national markets. It is the declared objective of the Community to negotiate with third countries a mutual opening of markets for public procurement within the GATT framework.
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Another concern focuses on the possible absorption of the Community's political energies by the creation of the single market, thus leaving not enough room and attention for the current multilateral trade negotiations. According to some inside observers, the Uruguay Round has come to be dominated by initiatives from the United States, while the other contracting parties simply sit back to observe first and react later.
In the case of the EC, one of the reasons for its more defensive attitude is to be found in its decision-making process which is far less efficient than the one practiced by other individual contracting parties. 76 One could ask of course if it is not in the first place the Community's priority to create and stabilize the internal market before embarking on a new project of opening up world markets elsewhere? Yet, it appears that the major negotiating tasks of opening up markets both inside and outside the EC are intrinsically linked to each other. From a world-wide perspective the EC is still the one trading block that relies most heavily on a prospering world trade to which it contributes more than 40%. Although the SEA does not refer to external policies, every step in the completion of the internal market will inevitably be accompanied by considerations on its possible external effects on industries whose survival hinges on good trade relations with third countries. For the Uruguay Round the final conclusion has been set for the period of 26 November to 8 December 1990. 77 This chronological separation from the final completion of the internal market by the end of 1992 may well be indicative of how much the Community's trading partners have become confident that the internal market will not be more protectionist than the present-day EC and, more importantly, that it will allow the EC to act in conformity with any agreement on world trade liberalization which would materialize from the Uruguay Round.
The Effects on EFTA Member States
The EFTA Member States, the Community's European and most important trading partners, are closely linked to the Community by bilateral preferential Free Trade Agreements, and will be confronted with the dilemma of whether to acceed to the EC or to stay outside. Since an accession to the Community is discussed as a feasible solution to the problems posed by the internal market in only two countries, 78 a further analysis of viable alternatives for some or all EFTA Member States is clearly called for. In consequence, the envisaged European Economic Space will scarcely be realized by an "overall" multilateral approach extending beyond the outlined concept of a structured partnership. It will be more realistic for both the EC and the EFTA Member States to try to reach agreements on specific sectors. Once again, the future shape of the EC's foreign economic relations will bear the imprint of third countries' attitude to the internal market. Much will also depend on whether EFTA Member States are prepared to recognize the indispensable role of the law as the necessary foundation for any closer cooperation in trade relations. The acceptance of, fpr example, the principle of direct applicability and binding dispute settlement procedures presupposes to a certain extent a loss of autonomy or sovereignty. The only available alternative would be an exclusion from the dynamic evolution of the internal market and the ultimate retreat into following the relevant EC rules unilaterally without being able to influence their content 
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Neither the Court of Justice of the European Communities nor the courts in other jurisdictions have held -with a few exceptions -GATT law to be directly applicable. 92 The dispute settlement procedure within the GATT continues to be based on consensual solutions to be found for the relevant interstate disputes.
Recent developments, however, have mirrored a growing concern about the international trading system's fragility. Ceterum censeo: one of the major reasons explaining this feature of the international trade order remains the lack of efficient judicial control of signed international agreements and the lack of enforcement of rights of the individual with respect to foreign trade matters. It is promising, though, to note the current preoccupation with a more efficient legal framework for the international trading order. Important indications are -the topics agreed upon for negotiations in the Uruguay Round, especially the improvements of the rules on dispute settlement which have already been earmarked for provisional application from 1 January 1989 onwards. 93 The Mid-Term Review Conference expressly recognized the improved dispute settlement system as a central element in providing the multilateral trading system with security and predictability; 94 -the growing practice in bilateral agreements to include binding forms of judicial dispute settlement such as the relevant rules in the American-Canadian Free-Trade Agreement 95 or the arbitration clause in the EC Switzerland Agreement on Insurance signed on 10 October 1989, 96 and -the detailed rules on binding dispute settlement in the multilateral Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. 97 It may be worth noting that on 22 June 1989, the ECJ, in the first case decided on the basis of the New Instrument -FEDIOL III 98 -, has -at least in an indirect manner -applied and interpreted GATT rules in order to uphold the Commission's decision not to take protective measures. The Court reasoned that the contested practices of Argentina in the field' of export of soya meal did not violate the relevant GATT rules (Art. Ill, XI, XX and XXIII). The ECJ justified the application of GATT rules by arguing that the Council regulation on the New Instrument expressly refers to "rules of public international law or to other generally accepted rules." 99 Because of this express reference to the rules of international trade law, the Court of Justice felt to be bound to apply GATT and other international trade law in order to establish whether the Commission had acted in accordance with these provisions referred to in the New Instrument being part of secondary Community law. This, in terms of international trade law, precedential case demonstrates that even the GATT with its many generalities is precise enough to be interpreted and applied by courts and that judges are not overburdened by complex economic assessments when dealing with GATT disputes.
Thus, the European experience with the rule of law as a decisive factor in economic integration may contribute to a more rule-oriented approach in world trade relations. At present, the Community certainly has no reason to repent, having bound its protective New Instrument to the observance of international legal obligations. It is only to be hoped for that this example will be followed by the EC's trading partners. One of the issues in the Uruguay Round could be to oblige the contracting par-ties to insert into their domestic law provisions which guarantee an effective application of the rules of international trade law. On a more limited sector such a provision can already be found in Art X(3)b) GATT. Another solution could be to provide for a procedure to ask for preliminary rulings by GATT institutions as to the interpretation of GATT rules. 100 A more, stringent dispute settlement procedure resulting in more precise and predictable solutions for trade disputes would be one of the preconditions for a more effective framework of world trade.
The SEA and the Regionalization of World Trade
European integration, as it is conceived by the SEA, has encountered suspicions and fears abroad of a forthcoming "fortress" closing in on itself behind walls of protectionism. As mentioned in Part IV there are a number of possible developments which point to the opposite direction: given the experience of creating the "common market", the internal market with its liberalizing and deregulating objective will, from the third countries' vantage-point, be more trade-creating than trade-diverting. In any case, final conclusions may only be possible in the period after 1993. Too much depends on the attitudes adopted by third countries in response to the internal market and the final results of the Uruguay Round. If the future world trade order was to become subdued by protectionism, the EC as a region most dependent on international trade, would be its first victim.
The SEA makes a further attempt at integrating the European region. The principles underlying the creation of the European market are very similar to the GATT's basic notions on world trade. Art. XXIV GATT acknowledges the desirability of closer integration, provided that no new trade barriers between the contracting parties are raised (para. 4). 101 It has never been conclusively stated by the Contracting Parties of GATT whether the EC fulfills all the requirements of Art. XXIV GATT.
Meanwhile, other regional free trade areas are being contemplated. 102 A rather astonishing example is the concept of an American-Japanese Free Trade Area which would no more be regional, but transcontinental comprising two of the largest economic powers. Given the text of Art. XXTV GATT, there would be no obstacle to the creation of such a FTA. Art XXIV (3)(a) GATT refers explicitly to "adjacent territories" which may agree on certain advantages to facilitate frontier trade. Ait XXIV (4) GATT, in contrast, only mentions "countries." However, it is debatable 
